Mike Lee is an avid reader and former technical writer.
Rating system
"We reveal ourselves through our preferences. You are what you like—and, crucially, you aren’t what you don’t."
Saturday, April 25, 2026
Satu Rämö, The Clues in the Fjord ** 1/2
Sunday, April 19, 2026
Randy Baker, Half Fast ****
Monday, April 13, 2026
Andrew Miller, The Land in Winter *** 1/2
Tuesday, April 7, 2026
Yoko Tawada, Exophony ***
Saturday, April 4, 2026
Charlotte McConaghy, Wild Dark Shore ***
Tuesday, March 31, 2026
Henry Threadgill, Easily Slip Into Another World ***
Friday, March 20, 2026
Vincenzo Latronico, Perfection ****
It is a life of coffees taken out on the east-facing balcony... while scrolling New York Times headlines and social media on a tablet. the plants are watered as part of a daily routine that also includes yoga and a breakfast featuring an assortment of seeds. ... And it is a happy life...for rental at one hundred and eighteen euros a day, plus the fee to cover the Ukrainian cleaner, paid through a French gig economy company that files its taxes in Ireland; plus the commission for the online hosting platform, with offices in California but tax-registered in the Netherlands...
What was happening in the city—the replacement of its historical inhabitants with younger, wealthier newcomers, and the resulting price hikes and decline in diversity—was gentrification, a term used almost exclusively by the people who caused it.
Monday, March 16, 2026
George Santayana, The Essential Santayana ** 1/2
There's no way that truly essential Santayana should run to over 600 pages. The title suggests a judicious selection of important articles in which the philosopher George Santayana clearly and concisely explains his theories. The Essential Santayana, by contrast, includes whole chapters from his major books while strangely omitting entirely his first successful first book about aesthetics. For example, it includes thirteen chapters from Skepticism and Animal Faith when it could have relied on the paper "Some Meanings of the Word 'Is'," about which Santayana himself said "it contains my whole philosophy in a very clear and succinct form."
The heart of Santayana's philosophy is the idea that a person's worldview or philosophical system is akin to a personal work of art: it's a product of productive imagination that provides "a distinct vision of the universe" built to help us understand and navigate our lives. It is not, and could not be, an accurate objective description of the world. Ideas are symbols representing the world, metaphors emphasizing qualities useful to human interest. Santayana also believed that art supports the aspirations of our highest selves, so it is no insult to call a philosophy a work of art.
I find this vision compelling as a framework, but the specifics of Santayana's philosophy feel to me derivative of other thinkers. I was also put off by his often dismissive tone toward other philosophers, especially those who attempt to construct universal systems such as Kant or Plato. His personality seems opposite from the open-minded curiosity of his former teacher and colleague William James. He reserves his admiration for Spinoza, Heraclitus, and Democritis.
Tuesday, March 3, 2026
Wolfgang Herrndorf, Sand ****
Sunday, February 22, 2026
Sophie Elmhurst, A Marriage at Sea ****
Monday, February 16, 2026
Charlotte Wood, Stone Yard Devotional ***
Wednesday, February 11, 2026
Meghan O'Gieblyn, God Human Animal Machine ****
Many "new" ideas are merely attempts to answer questions that we have inherited from earlier periods of history, questions that have lost their specific context in medieval Christianity as they've made the leap from one century to the next, traveling from theology to philosophy to science and technology.
The unanswerable questions we keep returning to are about subjectivity and understanding. What is consciousness? What counts as an explanation for natural phenomena?
Despite the technical subject matter, O'Gieblyn writes in the classic style of personal essays, including first-person stories about her own struggles with the issues. Her style makes the abstruse topics feel relevant, although I sometimes lost the thread of her argument.
She makes thought-provoking connections; for example, thinking of consciousness as software running on the hardware of the brain is a modern variant of the mind-body problem, which in turn is a recurrence of the religious idea of a soul. ("The metaphor has not solved our most pressing existential problems; it has merely transferred them to a new substrate.") I was particularly intrigued by the idea that science struggles to understand subjectivity because the enterprise was designed precisely to eliminate subjectivity from our understanding.
Thursday, February 5, 2026
Daniyal Mueenuddin, This Is Where the Serpent Lives **** 1/2
Monday, January 26, 2026
Lyndal Roper, Summer of Fire and Blood ** 1/2
This history of the Peasant's War in Germany (1524-26) is extremely well researched and provides an abundance of detail about the massive public uprising that occurred just as the Reformation was taking hold. I got a clear sense of the peasant's grievances, the complex interplay of authority among the lords and clergymen, the social forces that led to the rebellion, even the attire of the armies. It's an impressive feat of research given that the events happened 500 years ago and the participants were either illiterate or self-interested.
Unfortunately, though, Roper writes like a sociologist rather than a narrative historian. The book is organized into chronological sections for autumn 1524 through summer 1525, but the individual chapters explore the conflict thematically, exploring concepts like freedom, lordship, and brotherhood.
One cause for this collapse of authority was the empire's confusing patchwork of different rights and claims. What prevailed was not what we today understand by 'rule.' Rather, it was a kind of negotiated governing that depended on cooperation and, ultimately, comparative strength. Rights and jurisdictions could be bought and sold or even swapped. The buyer of a castle might gain judicial rights associated with it; the tithe of a village could be bought as an investment. ... Because sovereignty was frequently fragmented and not unitary, subjects could sometimes pick their fights and play one authority against another.
The result feels curiously static for a bloody and tragic war story, a description of the "rich detail of [the peasants'] daily lives" not a chronicle of battles. I would be hard pressed to describe the chronology of the conflict or its flashpoints.
The last 10 pages reveal the reason for this academic approach: "Some of the most profound political debates in historical writing of the last two hundred years, and especially over Marxism and its legacies, were fought out on the terrain of the German Peasants' War." Marx and Engels both wrote about it, East and West Germany highlighted different aspects of it, and historians of the Reformation blame it on one or another of the major religious figures. Roper is engaging with the meaning of the conflict more than the tale.
Saturday, January 17, 2026
Tony Tulathimutte, Rejection ***
Monday, January 12, 2026
Agnes Callard, Open Socrates ****
Tuesday, December 30, 2025
Francis Spufford, Cahokia Jazz ***
Saturday, December 20, 2025
Ruth Garrett Millikan, Varieties of Meaning ** 1/2
Varieties of Meaning is a work of academic philosophy. The title and the back-cover abstract led me to believe it would explore the common thread that connects all the different things we say have meaning: "people mean to do various things, tools and other artifacts are meant for various things; people mean various things by using words and sentences; natural signs mean things ... What does meaning in the sense of purpose have to do with meaning in the sense of representing or signifying?" I've been pondering the meaning of "meaning" since my undergraduate days, and hoped for new insights.
But Millikan's topic is different. She uses evolutionary psychology to explore the nature of our internal representations (aka concepts), how they differ from those of non-human animals, and how we might have developed them. She concludes that concepts are more directly goal-oriented than is generally assumed, and that they are not constructed from intermediate sense impressions.
This topic is interesting even if it's not what I was looking for. However, Millikan falls into the common academic trap of focusing too much on esoteric terminological disputes at the expense of clear exposition, not to mention the evolutionary psychology vice of "just so stories."
There were a few asides that intrigued me. One was a (probably false) anecdote about how venomous snakes hunt and eat mice without the benefit of a concept of "mouse":
The story is that certain venomous snakes perceive mice for purposes of striking by sight, trace the path of the dying mouse by small, and find its head so as to swallow that part first by feel, and that none of those jobs can be accomplished using any other sensory modality. A snake that was wired up this way would merely perceive first a "strike me," then a "chase me," and finally a "swallow me," having no grasp at all that what it struck, followed, and swallowed was the same thing.
Another was the distinction, attributed to Gilbert Ryle, between "task verbs" that describe an attempt to do something (hunt, look, listen) and "achievement verbs" that indicate success (find, see, hear).