Balashov and Rosenberg (ed.), Philosophy of Science ****

This collection of "Contemporary Readings" is a solid overview of the major issues in the philosophy of science. Nearly all of the selections are clearly written and not too technical. The readings are not the primary sources (except for Quine's Two Dogmas), but are often shorter summaries from the original authors (such as Nagel and Kuhn).

The key takeaway is that the relationship between scientific theories and the actual operation of the world is complex and controversial. Do the abstract entities such as electrons and the electro-magnetic force actually exist, or are they conceptual models? What do we mean when we say that science "explains" a phenomenon? Can we observe anything without presupposing a theory of what we're looking at? How do we know that our current understanding is (mostly) right, especially considering the long history of discarded theories?

The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. (Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism")

I enjoyed reading this book for three reasons. First, I like considering the world from different perspectives, what I usually call "trying on different world views." The philosophy and history of science is littered with theories that explain the same phenomena in different ways. Second, I felt well educated because I was familiar with most of the topics and precedents covered. The philosophy of science has a kinship with the philosophy of language. Lastly, Philip Kitcher's essay "Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change" defends a view similar to my own about how to reconcile the meaning and reference of terms, and provides a clear mechanism for handling its content-sensitivity.